INTRODUCTION
Good morning. Thank you to the organizers for inviting me to participate today in this retrospective on the 2003 invasion of Iraq. My role this morning, as I understand it, is to parse the international legal arguments surrounding the invasion and to reconsider them in the fullness of time that has elapsed. It is a role I agreed to take on with hesitation because it is difficult to add much that is new. I suppose I can take comfort in saying what I've already said, and saying it again today, because of how I view my obligations as an international lawyer. I believe we lawyers have a duty to stand up and insist that our leaders adhere to the rule of law in international relations and to help ensure that they are held accountable for the failure to do so.
As I am sure you are all aware, much remains to be done in terms of accountability, especially in the United States, and it is disappointing that the Obama Administration has so far refused to prosecute what seem to be clear violations of the Torture Convention, including all the way up the chain of command if necessary. Today, however, my talk is confined to the legal arguments about the use of force in Iraq and an analysis of their persuasiveness.
CONTEXT

Now, many of you may have noticed the reports of former Prime Minister John
Howard speaking about the political or ethical justification of his government's participation in the 2003 invasion recently at the Lowey Institute.
2 International law was only incidental in this talk -a brief reference to the purported legal use of force under Security Council
Resolution 678 adopted on 29 November 1990, over 12 years prior to the invasion, which we will return to.
For now, though, I want to consider how Prime Minister Howard's defense was structured. It is striking, at least to me, how he seemed to go out of his way to make his defense relative. He strongly emphasized right at the outset that "context … is everything" when considering the 2003 invasion. He went on to locate his defense within what may be said to be the "known knows" and "unknown unknowns" -remember Donald Rumsfeldabout Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction and the consequences for Australia.
For Howard, the key context of the 2003 invasion is what he called "fear" and "dread".
Howard talked about the perceived "profound vulnerability", the "preoccupation" with the next attack, the "unnerved Americans", and so on.
3
Now as every first year law student learns, law is context dependent; law ordinarily follows facts so long as those facts are not themselves illegal. The international law debate about the facts surrounding the 2003 invasion has centered squarely on whether they, indeed, made it legal. Surely the burden of proof was and is on Australia, the US, and the UK to demonstrate that the war in Iraq fell within an exception to the prohibition to the use of force. As Hersch Lauterpacht wrote in connection with recognition, when alleged illegality raised by facts "consists in acts of aggression against … other members of the
[international] community in deliberate disregard of fundamental legal obligations of conduct, a heavy … burden of proof falls upon those embarking on [their] legalization …".
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As I will explain, I do not believe that the so-called "coalition of the willing" met this burden, nor have subsequent developments legitimized the invasion.
And so, context -the factual context -is important in the legal analysis of Iraq.
John Howard's fear and dread of terrorism, however, provide an incorrect legal frame within which to examine the 2003 invasion. Rather, from an international legal point of view, two questions need to be considered. The first is whether the so-called "war on terror" following the 9/11 attacks worked any change in the international law limiting the use of force. The second question is more doctrinaire and relates to arguments about legal interpretation and implicit Security Council authorization (or not) prior to the 2003 invasion.
3 Id. 
PREEMPTION AND THE IRAQ WAR
I want to return now to the question about whether the so-called "war on terror" following the 9/11 attacks worked any change in international law's prohibition on the use of force.
The US position was that terror attacks like those of 9/11 were a fundamental Given … rogue states and terrorists, the US can no longer rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. ... We cannot let our enemies strike first … We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction … The doctrine of self-defense needs to be revised in the light of modern conditions. In particular, the requirement that a threat be imminent needs to be revisited. Howard asserted on the now defunct channel 9 program, Sunday, that Australia had a right of pre-emptive self-defense against terrorists in neighboring states. 8 Indignation by
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand followed and was increased by later suspicion that Australia was really trying to justify future action against Iraq.
In fact Australia did not use this justification for its participation in Operation Iraqi
Freedom in 2003. The U.S., however, did argue that it was possible to extend the war against terrorism in Afghanistan to cover action in Iraq on the basis of self-defense. For the US, the use of force in Iraq epitomized a lawful use of pre-emptive self-defense against terrorism. made persistent, but unsuccessful, attempts to obtain a second resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force. Despite the lack of a second resolution, Australia, the UK and US argued that the essential feature of Resolution 1441 was that it not expressly stipulate that another resolution was required. Nowhere did it say that the Security Council must adopt a second Security Council resolution before military action would be authorized. The key paragraph, Paragraph 12, required only that the Security Council meet to "consider the situation" which, Australia, the US, and UK claimed, did not require a further Security
Council decision. Accordingly, their view was that states were free to unilaterally resort to force against Iraq in the event of further material breaches of the cease-fire regime.
Ultimately, the "coalition" of the US, the UK and Australia, with the political and other support of over 40 other states, went ahead with Operation Iraqi Freedom without a second resolution. They based their action on a claim that the authority to use force in Resolution 678 in 1990 had been revived. The Australian and UK governments set out the legal case for military action against Iraq. In essence, it was argued that Authority to use force against Iraq arose from the combined effects of resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The argument essentially proceeded in nine steps as follows:
1. Resolution 678 authorized force against Iraq to eject it from Kuwait and to restore peace and security in the area.
2.
Resolution 687, which set out the cease-fire conditions after Operation Desert Storm, imposed continuing obligations on Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction in order to restore international peace and security in the area.
3. Resolution 687 suspended but did not terminate the authority to use force under resolution 678.
4.
A material breach of resolution 687 revives the authority to use force under resolution 678.
5. Resolution 1441 determined that Iraq was and remained in material breach of resolution 687, because it had not fully complied with its obligations to disarm.
6. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" and warned Iraq of the "serious consequences" if it did not.
7. Resolution 1441 also said that if Iraq failed at any time to comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of resolution 1441, it would commit a further material breach.
8. It was plain, at least to the US, UK, and Australia, that Iraq had failed so to comply and was and continued to be in material breach.
9. Thus, the authority to use force under resolution 678 was said to have been revived.
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Ultimately, this justification and the claim of prior Security Council authorization failed to convince the vast majority of other states. While the argument has plausibility, it is far and away not the best reading of these resolutions. The context of the situation and better reasoning and reasons support a reading that a second Security Council resolution was required and that the US, UK and Australia did not have the necessary authorization and acted unlawfully.
Let's consider the consider problems other states had with the justification given by Australia, the US and UK. First, as already mention, the US and UK desperately, but unsuccessfully sought a second resolution. Had they truly believed in the force of their argument about revival then presumably they would not have strived so hard for the second resolution.
Second, the prior authorization argument assumes, without any explicit legal basis or authority, that Resolution 678 and its authorization to "use all necessary means" continues in perpetuity and that it could be invoked unilaterally despite the cease-fire declared in
Resolution 678. The better way to look at things under the Charter, of course, is that once a cease-fire is established then fresh authority to use force is required. Unlike the law preCharter, the use of force is outlawed and the breach of a treaty (even a cease-fire treaty)
cannot be used to justify the use forcible measures to compel compliance. This narrow view of permissible violence post-Charter is confirmed by the strong and universally accepted jus cogens prohibition on the use of force.
Third, how could it be that Resolution 678 was designed to provide authority to use force in circumstances that were much different than were present in 1990. what is a material breach and who is to make that determination? The US, UK and Australia asserted a right to determine for themselves whether there was a further material breach by
Iraq and also a right to decide whether to resort to force. Many other states did not accept this interpretation of the relevant resolutions. These states instead insisted that the decisions on material breach and on the use of force were for the Security Council. These states argued that only the Security Council could determine the cease-fire was over. For them, a Security Council finding was a necessary to determining that Iraq was in material breach of the cease-fire, that the cease-fire was at an end, and that a either new authority to use force against Iraq should be give or existing authority under Resolution 678 had been revived. In
Resolution 1441 all the Security Council had found was that Iraq "has been and remains in Resolutions. Indeed, they appear to exhibit and cautious unwillingness to approve seemingly necessary measures. The way in which the US, UK and Australia mounted their revival argument has, no doubt, hampered the ability to reach agreement in the Security Council on urgent humanitarian disasters like Syria and elsewhere. One hopes that in the future the long work on cooperative action in the Security Council will be preferred to plausible, but unpersuasive, legal interpretation.
Thank you.
